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SYMPOSIUM ON PURSUING RACIAL
FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TWENTY
YEARS AFTER McCLESKEY v. KEMP*

MARCH 2-3, 2007

INTRODUCTION
NEW FRAMEWORKS FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Jeffrey Fagan**

Mukul Bakhshi***

This Symposium, "Pursuing Racial Fairness in the Administration of
Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey v. Kemp," was conceived and inspired by
Theodore Shaw, Director-Counsel and President of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. Ted Shaw and his staff worked with Columbia Law
School Professor Jeffrey Fagan to recruit an outstanding group of scholars and
activists who met on March 2-3, 2007 to hear and comment on the articles
appearing in this Symposium. In addition to the authors whose work appears in
this issue, many others made important contributions to the Symposium through
their commentaries and presentations. These include Christina Swarns, Cathleen
Price, Dean Charles Boger, Lawrence C. Marshall, Dick Burr, George Kendall,
Charles Ogletree, Kendall Thomas, Bryan Stevenson, Steven Hawkins, Wayne
McKenzie, State Senator Rodney Ellis, David Singleton, and Gara LaMarche. We
are grateful to all of them for their invaluable contributions.
Professor of Law and Public Health, and Co-Director, Center for
Institutional and Social Change, Columbia Law School.
J.D. candidate, Columbia Law School.
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A SOMBER ANNIVERSARY

This year marked the twentieth anniversary of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,' a case whose
ramifications for the pursuit of racial equality within criminal justice
are still felt today. McCleskey set an impossibly high bar for
constitutionally-based challenges seeking fundamental racial
fairness in capital punishment. The McCleskey court avoided the
"racial blindsight", or color-blindness, that characterizes much
contemporary civil rights and criminal justice jurisprudence.2
Instead, the Court embraced the reality that prosecutors craft pretextual, race-neutral explanations for selective prosecutions of death
sentences, as well as compelling evidence of the racially skewed and
biased patterns of their aggregate decisions.3 But the McCleskey
decision went even further: it created a jurisprudential climate that
shifted and increased the burden on defendants seeking
constitutional relief from discriminatory and biased decisions at
every step of the criminal justice process, from arrest to conviction
and punishment.
McCleskey had two intersecting messages, and the
consequences of each fell squarely on the backs and bodies of African
Americans in the criminal justice system. First, McCleskey demanded
a showing of specific racial animus even when defendants could show
a strong pattern and practice of discrimination in discretionary
decisions by prosecutors and other legal actors. In the McCleskey
briefs, Professor David Baldus and his colleagues provided strong
empirical evidence of the racially discriminatory pattern of death
sentencing in Georgia during the years between the reinstatement of
capital punishment in 1973, upheld in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976, and
1979. Baldus et al. identified systemic racial disparities in the
decision to seek the death penalty and in the decision by juries to
1.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (affirming death sentence and
holding that evidence of racial disparity in death penalty cases was insufficient to
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment).
2.
Andrew Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind
CriminalJustice, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3-4,
on file with author) (discussing the judicial aversion to race-specific analyses in
constitutional criminal law and explaining how the psychological phenomenon of
racial blindsight causes people to be blind to the existence of racial biases in
society while at the same time subconsciously aware that these biases exist).
3.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314.
4.
Id. at 292-93.
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return capital verdicts: defendants who killed whites were 4.3 times
more likely to receive a death sentence than those who killed African
Americans.5
Even while accepting the Baldus research as correct,
however, the high court rejected Warren McCleskey's Equal
Protection claim. As Justice Powell stated, "To prevail under the
Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory intent."6 Of course,
absent some type of indiscreet comment by a prosecutor or judge that
provides "smoking-gun" proof of discriminatory intent, the
evidentiary threshold required by McCleskey was then and still is
virtually insurmountable.
Moreover,
the insertion
of an
individualized intent requirement freed the state of responsibility for
racially disparate outcomes resulting from the historical legacy of
racial oppression and from unconscious racial biases.
The second prong of McCleskey gained less attention but was
equally pernicious. The Court said it would tolerate errors in
criminal justice,7 without acknowledging their prevalence, their
possible consequences, their racial skew, or other biases in the
patterns of error. Even when death is the outcome, the Court
accepted the prospect of error: "There can be 'no perfect procedure for
deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to
impose death.'"8 Thus, the Court decided that structural
imperfections, however racially skewed they may be, were not just
inevitable, but were a necessary evil to preserve capital punishment.
Banking on a "super due process" safety net to regulate and prevent
racially skewed decisions, the McCleskey court dismissed the demand
for perfection and fairness, even when the consequences of error are
death. "Given these safeguards already inherent in the imposition
5.
Baldus collected data on every death sentence in Georgia from 1973 to
1979, and statistically controlled for 39 non-racial variables such as the
defendant's age, criminal record, motives, and mode of killing, to determine the
race-specific probability of receiving a death sentence. See David C. Baldus et al.,
Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis 319-20
(1990) [hereinafter Baldus Study]. These racial biases in Georgia persist today,
as revealed in a recent series on the administration of the death penalty in
Georgia, published in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. See Bill Rankin et al., An
AJC Special Report; A Matter of Life or Death: Death Still Arbitrary, Atlanta J.
Const., Sept. 23, 2007, at Al.
6.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
7.
Id. at 313 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1983)).

8.

Id.
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and review of capital sentences, the dissent's call for greater
rationality is no less than a claim that a capital punishment system
cannot be administered in accord with the Constitution." 9
The Court then invoked a form of "racial blindsight" by
declaring that Eighth Amendment challenges based on claims
similar to McCleskey's were so elastic that they could extend to other
arbitrary variables like facial characteristics
or physical
attractiveness: "The Constitution does not require that a State
eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a
potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice
system that includes capital punishment."0 In essence, the Court
held that it would not find a constitutional violation because it would
jeopardize not just capital punishment, but the functioning of the
criminal justice system:
McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws
into serious question the principles that underlie our entire
criminal justice system. . . . Thus, if we accepted
McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly
tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be
faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty."I
Rather than confront the difficult issues raised by the
disparate racial impact of sentencing, and the wholesale
reconsideration of the criminal justice policies that would ensue, the
Court chose to tolerate widespread errors and racial disparities,
finding no offense to the Constitution in these patterns. In so doing,
the McCleskey Court reified the institutional norms and structural
biases that sustain racial imbalances in all stages of the criminal
law.
The McCleskey Court, in refusing to consider the impact of
race on juror and prosecutorial decisions, allowed these norms,
preferences, and biases to play a significant role in sentencing
without any constitutional remedy. 2 One consequence of racially
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 315 n.21.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 314-15.

12.
The institutionalization of preferences and biases into the everyday
practices of a prosecution office that often sought the death penalty was revealed
by the public disclosure of a training video from 1986 that described in detail
techniques for discriminating in jury selection, including maintenance of a

running tally of the race of the venire panel and the invention of pre-textual
reasons for exercising peremptory challenges. The tape, created by then-assistant
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"cleansed" juries is a significantly greater likelihood of death verdicts
for African Americans. 3 Professor Jennifer Eberhardt and colleagues
used experimental methods to expose the moving parts of this
process. Re-analyzing the Baldus database of Philadelphia-area
death-eligible cases,1 4 this study shows that among cases with a black
defendant and white victim, 57.5% of 'stereotypically black'
defendants received death sentences in comparison to 24.4% of
defendants with less stereotypically black features. 5 When both the
defendant and victim were African-American, however, there was no
statistical disparity in death sentences attributable to the racial
features.' 6 The cascades of black incarceration and other visible
manifestations of increased black presence in criminal justice
institutions 7 may have created an assumption of black criminality
that leads prosecutors and jurors to be especially punitive.

district attorney Jack McMahon of the Philadelphia County District Attorney's
Office, included such statements as: "Let's face it,... there's the blacks from the
low-income areas[,] ... you don't want those people on your jury." Notes from one
of the lawyers present at the jury selection training program-conducted by
another prosecutor several years after the videotaped training-disclosed that
prosecutors were again taught such things as, "The ideal jury, 12 Archie Bunkers,
will convict on little evidence." See David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory
Challenges in Capital Murder Trials:A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 3 (2001) (studying the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors and
defense counsel in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; using the tape to help
define the groups of venire persons targeted). Baldus et al. showed that during 23
homicide prosecutions, the trial prosecutor struck black jurors 3.3 times more
frequently than white jurors, and 10 times more frequently in the case actually
before the court. Id. at 58. This study also reported a statistically significant
relationship between the racial composition of Philadelphia death penalty juries
and the disproportionate rate at which these juries were sentencing AfricanAmerican defendants to death. Id. at 84-95.
13.
Id. at 84-95.
14.
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17
Psychol. Sci. 383, 384 (2006) (analyzing data from the study published by David
C. Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era:An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings from Philadelphia,
83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 (1998), (showing the importance of stereotyped racial
features in jurors' attributions of culpability and "deathworthiness")).
15.
Eberhardt et al., id. at 385.
16.
Id. at 385.
17.
See Marc Maurer, Race to Incarcerate 118-26 (2d ed. 2006) (identifying
sources of exponential growth in the U.S. prison population and offering
explanations for disparities in imprisonment of African Americans); Michael
Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Punishment in America 28-31, 49-68
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The racial skew in death verdicts reflects in no small part the
accumulation of selective prosecutions and the systematic application
of discretion freed from constitutional regulation and oversight. But
there also are structural features of criminal law and criminal justice
that adversely affect African Americans and other racial and ethnic
minorities. Animated by the War on Drugs, the racialized selectiveenforcement of drug laws and the structured sentencing practices in
these laws are primary forces in the production of large racial
disparities in incarceration.' 8 The costs of the War on Drugs, with its
harsh sentencing regimes, largely fall on minority communities and
bolster societal stereotypes of minority criminality. Although whites
have higher rates of drug use, three-fifths of drug offenders
imprisoned in 1998 were African-American. '9 That result partly
occurs because of the vicious cycle of increased police enforcement
and incarceration that is concentrated largely in poor, predominantly
minority neighborhoods. 0 "Incarceration begets more incarceration,
and incarceration also begets more crime, which, in turn, invites
more aggressive enforcement, which then resupplies incarceration."2'
In New York City, for instance, the adoption of "zero tolerance"
policies and aggressive police patrol initiatives like "Operation
Condor," which involved the use of police overtime for buy-and-bust
operations in primarily minority neighborhoods, have accelerated
minority imprisonment at a time of declining crime rates.22

(1996) (examining the causes of racial disparities in the criminal justice system

and showing the centrality of drug sentencing statutes to the growth of the U.S.
prison population).

18.

See Tonry, supra note 17, at 81-83. See also R. Richard Banks, Beyond

Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008);

Steven Wu, The Secret Ambition of Racial Profiling, 115 Yale L.J. 491, 498
(2005); David J. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work
12 (2002); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1795
(1998); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarcerationin New

York City Neighborhoods, 30 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1551 (2003); Randall Kennedy,
Race, Crime and Law (1997).
19.
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration
in African American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271, 1275 (2004).

20.

Fagan et al., supra note 18. See also Leonard Saxe et al., The Visibility

of Illicit Drugs: Implications for Community-Based Drug Control Strategies, 91

Amer. J. Pub. Health 1987, 1991 (2001) (showing few differences in drug selling
between whites and non-whites, but greater police enforcement in poorer and
more disadvantaged neighborhoods).

21.
22.

Id. at 1554.
Id. at 1563-66.
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We see today these legacies of McCleskey in drug enforcement
and incarceration, as well as on death row. African Americans and
Hispanics are more likely to be stopped by the police, and searched
and arrested if stopped. 23 African Americans are overrepresented in
prisons relative to the rate at which they commit crime.24 Their
sentences are longer, reflecting sentencing laws which, in most
states, mandate long spells of incarceration for violent crimes and
drug offenses with little room for modifications or exceptions in
individual circumstances. 25 For capital crimes, they are more likely to
receive the death penalty.26 In fact, the racial disparities in the

23.
See, e.g., Matthew R. Durose et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2005 1 (2005),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf (finding that for the period 200205, Hispanics and blacks were more likely to be searched than whites at a traffic
stop). See also Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk
Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. Am. Stat. Ass'n 803 (2007)
(finding that persons of African and Hispanic descent were subject to more
pedestrian stops by New York police officers than whites even after controlling
for precinct variability and race-specific estimates of crime participation).
24.
Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life
Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration,69 Am. Soc. Rev. 151
(2004). See also Alfred J. Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of U.S.
Prison Populations, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1259 (1982) (reporting higher
incarceration rates for African Americans based on comparisons of ratio of racespecific clearance rates to race-specific incarceration rates); Alfred Blumstein,
Race and Criminal Justice, in America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their
Consequences, Volume II (Neil Smelser et al. eds., 2001).
25.
Tonry, supra note 17, at 41-44.
26.
See, e.g., John Donohue, Capital Punishment in Connecticut, 19732007: A Comprehensive Evaluation from 4,600 Murders to One Execution 1
(2007),
http://apublicdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/34239635.pdf;
Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration
of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-99, 4 Margins 1 (2004) (using
multivariate regression analysis to show racial preferences for white-victim
homicides in death-seeking by prosecutors in Maryland based on analysis of 1,311
death-eligible cases from 1978 to 1999). Prosecutors filed death notices in 353 of
the 1,311 death-eligible cases, which were 21.85% of the state's 6000 murders
during the study interval. Id. at 18-20. Death notices were withdrawn in 140
cases. Id. at 20. White-victim cases accounted for 44% of the death-eligible cases,
but accounted for 66% of the death notices. Id. at 25. Of the 76 cases concluding
in a death sentence, 80% were white-victim cases. Id. Prosecutors filed death
notices 2.5 times more often for white-victim cases than black-victim cases; death
sentences were more than five times more likely in white-victim homicides. Id. at
26. After controlling for offense, offender, victim and county characteristics,
Paternoster et al. showed that prosecutors filed death notices 1.7 times more
often against defendants who were accused of murdering a white victim. Id. at
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selection of cases for capital prosecution are no less today than they
were nearly three decades ago during the Baldus Study in Georgia
that was part of the McCleskey challenge. 27 Not only are African
Americans convicted of killing whites more likely to be selected for
capital prosecution, they are more likely to be executed if they kill a
white person than if they kill someone of another race. 28 We now
know the serious consequences of these disparities: the same racial
factors that underlie disparities in death sentencing-interracial
homicides committed by black defendants and the ratios of blackvictim and white-victim homicides-also are implicated in the
production of the very high rate of reversals in death sentences.29
The harsher treatment of African Americans and other racial
and ethnic minorities cannot be dismissed solely as a matter of racial
differentials in crime rates. Modern empirical research shows that
these differences persist more as a matter of selective enforcement

37. Black defendants who kill white victims were more than twice as likely to
receive death notices, 2.5 times more likely to be sentenced to death, and 3.6
times more likely to be executed compared to black defendants who kill black
victims. Id.; see also Michael Millemann & Gary Christopher, Preferring White
Lives: The Racial Administrationof the Death Penalty in Maryland, 5 U. Md. L.J.
Race, Religion, Gender & Class 1 (2005) (explaining the significance of the
Paternoster dataset in highlighting the racially discriminatory application of the
death penalty in Maryland); Rankin et al., supra note 5.
27.
See David C. Baldus et al., Race and ProportionalitySince McCleskey
v. Kemp (1987): Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance,
39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 143, 160-61 (2007); Rankin et al., supra note 5;
Paternoster et al., supra note 26.
28.
David Jacobs, Zhenchao Qian, Jason Carmichael, and Stephanie L.
Kent, Who Survives on Death Row? An Individual and ContextualAnalysis, 72
Amer. Soc. Rev. 610 (2007) (showing statistically that African Americans
convicted of killing whites are more likely than other murderers to receive a
death sentence and more likely to be executed, and that African Americans on
death row for killing nonwhites are less likely to be executed than other
condemned prisoners).
James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So
29.
Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It at 2 (2002),
httpJ/www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf (showing that 68% of all
death sentences between 1973 and 1995 were reversed due to serious errors, and
using multivariate regression analysis to show that the reversal rates are higher
in states where the ratio of white homicide victims to black homicide victims is
higher; the same analysis showed that reversal rates are higher in states that
have a larger black population). See also Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System:
The PersistentPatterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J.
Emp. Legal Studies 209, 209 (2004).
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than crime-rate differences.3" Also, both trial and appellate courts are
less willing to address racial imbalances in the criminal justice
system. Instead, courts give strong deference to legal actors, and
often cite a balancing test of the threat of crime against closer
scrutiny of local practices.31
II. THE CONTEXT
Both the past and future of McCleskey require careful
analysis of the specific social and historical context of the decision.
The case was decided just a few years into the dawn of a
jurisprudential era that was less receptive (if not hostile) to racebased challenges in both criminal and civil law. As Robert Stroup
shows in his contribution to the Symposium, the decision also came
at the conclusion of an era of intense activism and conflict in
American society over racial inequality and race discrimination.3 2
McCleskey was one of the first decisions in an ongoing historical
process that has expanded the discretion of legal decision-makersfrom police through corrections officials-and simultaneously
insulated them from meaningful constitutional challenges.33
30.
See, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 23; Ronald Weitzer & Steven A.
Tuch, Race and Policing in America (2006); Saxe et al., supra note 20.
31.

See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (finding that

pretextual stops of motor vehicles by police are permissible so long as the officer
has probable cause that a crime may have occurred); Brown v. City of Oneonta,
195 F.3d 111, 116-19 (2d Cir. 1999), amended and vacated 221 F.3d 329, 334-36
(2d Cir. 2000). The tortured procedural history of Brown shows the tensions that
arise when the courts apply race-blind analyses to criminal law enforcement

when its moving parts are transparently and facially racial. See 221 F.3d at 329;
195 F.3d at 111. The district court in Brown issued four separate opinions after
both sides to the dispute made several motions for reconsideration. See 221 F.3d
at 335-36 (recounting the procedural history leading to amended opinion). On
appeal, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' § 1983
claims under the Equal Protection Clause and, with regard to several plaintiffs,
denied their Fourth Amendment claims. See 195 F.3d at 123. The following year,
the panel abruptly reversed itself on several Fourth Amendment claims while
adhering to its decision that the police sweep did not involve any discriminatory
intent. See 221 F.3d at 336.
32.

Robert H. Stroup, The Political, Legal & Social Context of the

McCleskey Habeas Litigation,39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 74 (2007).
33.

See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100

Mich. L. Rev. 505, 558 (2001) ("The commitment to prosecutorial discretion rules
out aggressive equal protection review of charging decisions, the kind of review
that would seek out and correct enforcement disparities among different

10
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Racial profiling, a central strategy in the War on Drugs, has
generated numerous constitutional challenges that have been
rebuffed almost without exception. 34 The U.S. Supreme Court has
shown its preference for protecting prosecutorial and law
enforcement discretion rather than limiting the racially disparate
exercise of that discretion.35 In United States v. Armstrong, for
example, the Supreme Court reversed a decision permitting
36
discovery to prove racially selective prosecution for crack cocaine.
Despite evidence that all twenty-four prosecutions in the local area
were of African-American defendants, the Court determined that the
defendants had failed to show that the government declined to
prosecute similarly situated defendants of another race.37 In Whren v.
United States, the Court held that a police officer's subjective reasons
for stopping a car were irrelevant to determining the
constitutionality of that stop; rather, the stop's constitutionality
should be considered from the perspective of a reasonable officer
considering the circumstances of the stop.38 Four years later, in
Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court held that unprovoked flight in a highcrime area established reasonable suspicion to legitimize the police
officer's stop of the defendant. 39 Taken together, the Court's rulings
population groups and would bar irregular and sporadic enforcement
altogether.").
See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug
34.
War, Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008); Steven Wu, The Secret Ambition of Racial
Profiling, 115 Yale L.J. 491, 498 (2005); David J. Harris, Profiles in Injustice:
Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work 12 (2002). See also William J. Stuntz, Race,
Class and Drugs, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1795 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of
Whren v. United States: The Song Remains the Same, in Race and Law Stories
(Devon Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds., 2007).
In these cases, even when race is not a factor in the litigation, the
35.
weight of the decision more often falls on racial minorities. See, e.g., Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (holding that border agent's squeezing of
a bus passenger's soft luggage violated the Fourth Amendment). But the Bond
doctrine has been often limited in scope. See, e.g., United States v. Flowal, 234
F.3d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that because defendant fit a drug courier
profile and consented to the search, Bond is inapplicable). Race neutrality in
criminal law is a fiction, and often the indicia of race are substituted for race
itself.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996).
36.
37.
38.
note 34.
39.
required

Id. at 465.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996). See Johnson, supra
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) ("[O]fficers are not
to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining
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allow officers to consider the criminality of the location-which often
is a proxy for minority neighborhoods-thereby lowering the bar for
establishing reasonable suspicion for a search: upon review, the
police officer's intent is dismissed as irrelevant, and evidence of
racial discrimination in prosecution is required to meet an
extraordinarily high threshold. °
The Supreme Court has been far more receptive, however, to
efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in the jury selection process,
drawing a clear distinction between the importance of race in
Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky,
the Court rejected the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors to
exclude African Americans from a jury pool and allowed defendants
to establish a prima facie case of systematic minority exclusion to
compel an explanation from prosecutors. 4' The Supreme Court has
robustly attempted to protect voir dire from racial discrimination by
prosecutors, extending, for instance, the Batson doctrine to allow
defendants to challenge the race-based exclusion of potential jurors of
a different race through peremptory challenges. 42 In Miller-El v.
Dretke, the Supreme Court intervened in two separate cases to give
the defendant the opportunity to challenge the peremptory exclusion
of over ninety percent of the African Americans in the jury pool.43 In
granting the defendant's habeas petition, the Supreme Court rejected
the prosecutor's pretextual explanations for the disparate conclusions
"which reek[ed] of afterthought." 4 The Court's opposition to racial
discrimination in juror selection-especially when contrasted with its
timidity in addressing discrimination in other areas of criminal

whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation.").
40.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken
Windows: Terry, Race and Disorderin New York City, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 457,
477 (2000) (showing that police officers focused Terry stops in New York City's
poorest neighborhoods with the highest minority concentrations, independent of
these neighborhoods' crime rates, evidently basing suspicion on their assumption
of the fungibility of minority population concentration in a neighborhood and an
elevated rate of crime).
41.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
42.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (drawing on Batson to hold
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State's
peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from
the petit jury solely on the basis of race).
43.
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
44.
Id. at 246.

12
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justice-can leverage the increased diversity of juries into the
potential for more equitable criminal justice outcomes, a dynamic
discussed by Professor Sherri Lynn Johnson in her contribution to
this Symposium.4 5 Moreover, the prohibition against racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges might alter prosecutorial
heuristics in choosing whether to pursue the death penalty in given
cases. However, the Batson compromise is threatened by Snyder v.
Louisiana46, where the use of non-racial factors in voir dire can mask
and mitigate facial evidence of racial bias in the use of preemptory
challenges. In Snyder, the masking of racial bias behind opaque and
vague race-correlated rationales cynically exploits the Batson
standards and contradicts the Court's holding in Miller-El.
These opinions resulted in part from changes in the Supreme
Court's composition since McCleskey, constituting a court whose
jurisprudential and ideological leanings departed sharply from those
of the Court just a generation earlier. The Court became even more
deferential to state actors than its predecessors who decided
McCleskey, substituting procedural limitations for a substantive
analysis of the wrongs a party sought to redress. 47 Moreover, lower
courts have also increasingly deferred to the states rather than
exerting the authority to protect the integrity of criminal justice
45.
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigatingfor Racial FairnessAfter McCleskey v.
Kemp, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 178 (2007).
.46.
Snyder v. Louisiana, 942 So.2d 484 (La. 9/6/06), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct.
3004 (U.S. June 25, 2007) (No. 06-10119). Snyder appealed his capital conviction,
claiming discriminatory intent and racial bias by the prosecutor in the use of
peremptory challenges to remove five African-American jurors. Synder also
claimed that the prosecutor's referencing of the O.J. Simpson case during closing
arguments provided further evidence of discriminatory intent in the use of
peremptory challenges. Snyder further alleged an apparent racial double
standard in the disqualification process, illustrated by the prosecutor's disparate
language used to question black and white prospective jurors. Moreover, the one
African-American juror initially accepted by the prosecution, a student teacher,
was later removed supposedly because his academic duties might cause him to
rush through deliberations. But the prosecutor accepted a white juror, a
contractor, who had home-building projects to complete and an ill wife, factors
that obviously would have similar impacts on deliberations.
47.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1086 (2007) (holding that
one-year statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas corpus relief is not
tolled while awaiting certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court); Hein v. Freedom
of Religion Foundation, 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007) (holding that taxpayer has no
standing to challenge "faith based initiatives" as violating the Establishment
Clause).
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processes, even when sidestepping procedural questions.48 For
instance, in Fry v. Pliler, the Court employed a more deferential
standard for assessing constitutional errors in a federal habeas
corpus review of a state criminal trial because of principles of comity
and federalism, even where the state court had not reviewed those
constitutional claims. 49
Despite the gains in the jury cases, formidable barriers to
bringing race-based equal-protection claims in the criminal law (and
other areas of law and social policy) still exist today. But as in the era
leading to Brown fifty years ago, these constitutional and procedural
obstacles pose challenges that legal scholars and advocates are
mobilizing to defeat. While challenges akin to McCleskey are unlikely
to succeed in the current jurisprudential climate, other legal and
social policy initiatives are underway to address the failures of the
criminal justice system.
For example, both before and after the attacks of September
11th, litigation opposing racial profiling led to a series of consent
decrees and legislative measures prohibiting such activity.50 Racial
data collection policies pursuant to these judicial and legislative
initiatives, moreover, often revealed in stark detail the unwarranted
disparities in police stops." Because many of these law enforcement
practices involve stopping innocent individuals, bringing cases
against racial profiling and other practices that produce disparate
racial impacts at the "point of entry" into the criminal justice system
can be useful in creating sympathetic profiles of racial discrimination
that can shift public opinion. Some state courts have also been
receptive to providing remedies for racially disparate practices. 2
Concerns about arbitrariness in the administration of the
death penalty, including concerns about racial fairness, have led at
48.
This worked both ways, as in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16
(2002), when the Court recognized preferences of the majority of states to prohibit
execution of the mentally retarded. Also, the Court recognized a consensus
against executing juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552-53 (2005).
49.
Fry v. Pliler, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2325 (2007).
50.
Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling,33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 41 (2001); David A. Harris, Good Cops: The Case for Preventive Policing

(2005).
51.
See Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center, http://www.racial
profilinganalysis.neu.edu/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2007).
52.
David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially
Biased CriminalJustice Practices, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 97, 118 (2007).

14

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[39:1

least nineteen states to use proportionality review to ensure that
death sentences are not arbitrarily imposed. 3 Proportionality review
typically compares the facts of the case at bar either to other deatheligible cases that were not selected for prosecution or to a smaller
pool of cases where the death sentence was actually imposed. Despite
such inclusion of proportionality review in the majority of death
penalty jurisdictions, states have sought even stronger safeguards
against arbitrariness.5 4 Several states have established commissions
to study the effectiveness, fairness, and race-neutrality of their death
penalty statutes and procedures." These commissions have

53.
Proportionality review is required by statute in 19 states: Alabama,
Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. Ala. Code §
13A-5-53(b)(3) (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 4209(g)(2)(a) (1972); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-10-35(c)(3) (1973); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.075(3)(c) (1976); La. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 905.9.1(c) (1976); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (1977); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 565.035(3)(3) (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-310(l)(c) (1977); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-2521.03 (1978); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(XI)(c) (1986); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(e) (1978); N.M. Stat. § 31-20A-4(C)(4) (1979); N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 470.30(3)(b) (1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1977); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.05(A) (West 1981); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (1962);
S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-12(3) (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D)
(1989); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1981). The Florida Supreme Court has
also mandated a proportionality review to ensure the death penalty conforms to
state constitutional provisions. See Sinclair v. State, 657 So.2d 1138, 1142 (Fla.

1995) (citing Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991)).
54.
In 2007, the North Carolina House of Representatives passed a Racial
Justice Act to allow those sentenced to death to challenge prosecutorial decisions
that might have been tainted by race. H1291, 2007 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2007),
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/House/HTML/H1291
vl.html. It also passed a proportionality review bill requiring the Supreme Court
to compare factually similar cases, as opposed to only examining other cases in
which a death sentence was actually imposed. H341, 2007 Gen. Assem. (N.C.
2007), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/House/HTMU
H341v2.html. Neither bill has yet become law.
See, e.g., Ariz. Capital Case Comm'n, Capital Case Commission Final
55.
Report (2002), http://www.azag.gov/CCC/FinalReport.html; Conn. Comm'n on the
Death Penalty, Study Pursuant to Public Act No. 01-151 of the Imposition of the
Death Penalty in Connecticut (2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/olr/Death%20
on
Capital
Ill.
Comm'n
Penalty%2OCommission%2OFinal%20Report.pdf;
Punishment, Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/complete(2002),
report.pdf; Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, An Empirical Analysis of
Maryland's Death Sentencing System with Respect to the Influence of Race and
Legal Jurisdiction (2003), http://www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/finalrep.pdf,
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recommended wide-ranging procedural reforms; a New Jersey
commission suggested abolishing the death penalty, 56 and New
Jersey's legislature followed the recommendation and became the
first state to repeal its capital punishment statute since Gregg 57.
Despite the limiting effects of the McCleskey decision,
concerns about errors and the possible execution of innocent
defendants have led to moratoria on capital punishment in other
states, including Illinois and Maryland.5 8 Legislators in Maryland
also are debating bills to abolish capital punishment.5 9 The Illinois
Governor's
Commission
on
Capital
Punishment
issued
recommendations that extended far beyond death penalty issues.6 °
The Commission recommended the taping of interrogations,6' the use
of sequential photo arrays, 62 and lii
limitations on the questioning of

Nev. Legislative Commission's Subcomm. to Study the Death Penalty and
Related DNA Testing, Work Session Document, 17th Special Session (2002),
http://leg.state.nv.us/7lst/interim/studies/deathpenalty/WorkSession/Work%20Se
ssion%20document%206-14-02.html; Pa. Supreme Court Comm. on Racial &
Gender Bias in the Justice System, Final Report of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System (2003),
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Supreme/BiasCmte/FinalReport.pdf;
N.J.
Death Penalty Study Comm'n, New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission
Report (2007), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc final.pdf; Va. Joint
Legislative Audit & Review Comm'n, Review of Virginia's System of Capital
Punishment (2001), http://jlarc.state.va.us/Meetings/DecemberOl/capital.pdf. See
also United States Dep't of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: A
Statistical Survey (2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html.
56.
See New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Study Report, supra
note 55, at 2.
57.
Jeremy Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes
Sentences of 8, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3.
58.
Laura Mansnerus, Panel Seeks End to the Death Penalty in New Jersey,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 2007, at Al.
59.
Id.; see also New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report,
supra note 55. In Maryland, two identical death penalty repeal bills are under
review by the Maryland House and Senate. H.B. 225, 2007 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2007);
S.B. 211, 2007 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2007). Governor Martin O'Malley has indicated
that he supports the abolition legislation and would sign it into law. John Wagner
& Eric Rich, O'Malley's Inaction Irks Prosecutors; Delay in New Rules Creates
Block, Gives Hope to Law's Opponents, Wash. Post, July 8, 2007, at Cll.
60.
Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment (2002),
http://www.state.il.us/defender/ccpri.html.
61.
New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report, supra note 55, at
37.
62.
Id. at 47.
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suspects with mental disabilities.6 3 If implemented, these
recommendations would improve fairness throughout the criminal
justice system, reducing the likelihood of erroneous convictions.
The events in Florida surrounding the 2000 presidential
election
raised
widespread
concerns
of minority
voter
disenfranchisement. 4 Felon disenfranchisement laws have also been
criticized for their role in diluting minority voting power. 65 In 2004,
the Ninth Circuit found compelling evidence of racial disparities in
the Washington criminal justice system to be sufficient for a trial on
the issue of whether felon disenfranchisement violated the Voting
Rights Act. 66 The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund is
currently leading similar challenges in other states.67 If these
challenges succeed, increased minority voting power may contribute
to the success of candidates who are more concerned with the
fundamental fairness of the criminal justice system than merely
appearing to be "tough on crime."
Reform efforts generally focus on the more sympathetic
victims of errors in the criminal justice system-individuals "driving
while black," or convicted of crimes they did not commit, or ex-felons
who seek the right to vote as part of their reintegration into society rather than on structural reforms that identify and remedy the
sources of disparity in criminal justice institutions. Advocates for
justice rely on public education and community organization and
advocacy, in addition to legislative and legal efforts. They struggle in
63.
Id. at 43.
64.
See Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon
Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (2006); Steven Ramirez & Aliza
Organick, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Race and the Integrity of Democracy in
America, 27 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 427 (2007); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement
as Punishment:Reflections on the Racial Issues of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1895
(1999).

65.
Ryan Paul Haygood, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, The
Right to Vote Continues to Elude Millions (2005) http://www.naacpldf.org/
content.aspx?article=563 (arguing against felon disenfranchisement laws on
grounds that they disproportionately exclude black and Latino communities from

voting process despite decades-old efforts to ensure minority voting rights).
66.
Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007).
67.
See NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Felon
Disenfranchisement-Free the Vote, http://www.naacpldf.org/issues.aspx?sub
context=40 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (describing cases in Alabama, Florida, and

New York in which the Legal Defense Fund is litigating claims of racially
discriminatory felon disenfranchisement statutes).
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the face of blatant dismissals of evidence of racial disparities-as in
McCleskey itself. They struggle to overcome the apathetic public and
hostile courts, and the desensitizing banality of everyday race
discrimination, 68 but manage to force changes. For example, former
U.S. Attorneys have recently acknowledged racial and ethnic
disparities in the criminal justice system.6 9 They have begun to
develop strategies to counter these problems and to address harsh
punitive measures as "ineffective crime prevention."70 With support
from prosecutors, advocates for social justice may be newly
empowered to challenge the racial disparities highlighted by the
Baldus Study.
III. THE SYMPOSIUM
We convened the Symposium on Pursuing Racial Fairness in
Criminal Justice at Columbia Law School in March 2007 to draw
lessons from current work on racial inequality in criminal law, and to
design new strategies to pursue the goals of both the McCleskey
litigation and the movement that surrounded the case. The
participants included legal scholars, practitioners, researchers and
activists who already had started the difficult analysis, mobilization,
and theorizing to develop the foundation of new models of legal
scholarship and civil rights advocacy to challenge McCleskey. The
contributions in this Symposium are not naYve with respect to the
formidable litigation-based challenges or the racial inequality that
persists in the criminal law. Rather, they take on the task of building
68.
See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and
Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination (NBER Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873 (showing evidence of racial discrimination

toward job applicants with African-American names); Joseph Price & Justin
Wolfers, Racial Discriminationamong NBA Referees (NBER Working Paper No.
13206, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13206 (showing that
personal fouls are awarded more often against players when they are officiated by
an opposite-race officiating crew than when officiated by an same-race refereeing
crew, and that these biases are likely to affect the chances of winning for

predominantly black teams).
69.

Federal Sentencing Reporter, Prosecutorial Decision-Making and

Racial/Ethnic Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Principles and
Guidelines,

(2007),

http://www.novembercoalition.orgfstayinfo/breaking07/

BrennanGuidelines.html. Careful study is needed to assess whether these
guidelines are practical, especially in the death penalty context.

70.

Id.
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a diverse and empirically-informed strategy that looks critically into
the institutional norms and designs of criminal justice agents. They
begin to identify the moving parts of structural racialized decisionmaking that produce the enduring disparities we see today. The
articles offer a sober and disturbing picture of racial discrimination
in criminal justice.
The articles locate racial disparities in the institutional
dynamics of criminal justice and in the racial skew of everyday
decision-making. While McCleskey articulated a crime-control
rationale for tolerance of error and refused to confront the racial
disparities inherent in those errors, other decisions offered an
affirmative argument for the institutionalization of racialized
discretion in criminal justice. The decisions denying race-based
claims in criminal law that began with McCleskey insulate criminal
justice actors from constitutional claims by bowing to the discretion
of decision-makers and celebrating the principle of faux blindness, or
race-neutral professional judgment.
Beginning with Terry v. Ohio,7 deference to professional
judgment and the carving out of a constitutionally-protected
discretionary space were deemed essential to the interests of effective
law enforcement. Few commentaries on Terry discuss its racial
dimensions, yet Terry's calculus deeply embedded race in the
subjectivity of official discretion.72 McCleskey, and later Armstrong,7 3

71.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (asserting that courts need to
"evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances

. . . anything less would invite intrusions upon

constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches"). It is hardly coincidental that the Terry opinion came in
the midst of riots in the poorest, predominantly minority neighborhoods of 47
American cities, in a presidential election year when "law and order" became
symbolic language to rally political support for harsher punishment for criminal
offenders. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder
(1968), also referred to as the Kerner Commission Report.
72.
Professor Anthony Thompson offered one of the very few analyses of
Terry that made explicit its racial narrative. See Anthony Thompson, Stopping
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956
(1999) (demonstrating how race has been excised from Fourth Amendment
analysis and its harms); David Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and
the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271, 273 (1997)
(concluding that recent Supreme Court law means "that police officers, if they are
patient, can eventually pull over almost anyone they choose").
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demanded a showing of specific racial animus by prosecutors to prove
claims of racially selective prosecution. The impact of this was to
create an unlighted space where discretion and subjective
professional judgments could proceed with neither accountability nor
recourse. Criminal justice institutions have had little incentive to
address systemic racial discrimination, whether through the
regulation of routinized decision-making, or through efforts to recast
the institutional norms and preferences that shape those everyday
decisions.74
The articles in this Symposium do not shrink from the
difficult task of strategizing legal challenges to revive the pursuit of
racial fairness throughout the criminal justice system. Instead, the
authors identify the frontlines of a renewed struggle for the pursuit
of racial fairness that was the heart of the McCleskey litigation.
Litigation remains an essential element of this work.
Professor Anthony Amsterdam discusses the endemic racial
discrimination that the courts have chosen to ignore, and shows how
the arbitrariness of the death penalty rejected in Furman has reemerged since Gregg.75 McCleskey has shut off statistical analysis as
a means to challenge racial discrimination in capital sentencing, but
Amsterdam offers a method to mitigate McCleskey and to ultimately
eradicate capital punishment altogether.76 He encourages lawyers
73.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (requiring that
defendants must produce "credible evidence" that similarly situated defendants of
other races could have been prosecuted but were not).
74.
Police officers function in organizational contexts where rewards and
sanctions, both formal and social, shape their conduct. They want to advance,
avoid discipline, and gain the respect of their superiors and peers. Accordingly, as
rational actors in rational organizations, one institutional reform that could affect
discretion is the use of incentives for model police behavior. See Erik Luna, Race,
Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 183, 196 (2003)
(discussing the possibility of such a reward structure). Although discretion is
deeply embedded in criminal law doctrine, others have imagined how social
science and technology can be put to work to narrow discretion and therefore
avoid errors and biases. See, e.g., Elizabeth Joh, Discretionless Policing:
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 Cal L. Rev. 199 (2007); Bernard
Harcourt, Against Prediction (2005).
75.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, University Professor and Professor of Law at
New York University School of Law, Opening Remarks at the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and Columbia Law School Symposium: Pursuing
Racial Fairness in the Administration of Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey
v. Kemp (Mar. 2, 2007), in 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 34 (2007).
76.
Id. at 48.
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and scholars to study the impact of race on capital sentencing
patterns in Southern states, and to then do exhaustive research in
the counties with the most egregious evidence of racial bias.77 He
argues that massive evidence of racial discrimination across several
jurisdictions will change the terms of public and judicial opinion.7 8 He
urges a shift in focus from states to counties, where death sentences
originate and where local contexts make them possible.79 County
studies, aided by court-ordered discovery and evidence of the racially
biased attitudes by prosecutors or law enforcement officials, will
provide the strongest tools for such a challenge.8 ° As Professor
Amsterdam notes, anecdotal evidence is "simply the tollbooth
payment that gets us onto the beltway around McCleskey."8' Such a
program will expose the absurdity of McCleskey in assuming that
Equal Protection only extends to the overt prejudice of an individual
decision-maker as opposed to the cultural context of racial
discrimination." Finally, lawyers should advance an argument that
the discriminatory administration of capital punishment statutes
requires their wholesale invalidation, 3 drawing upon cases such as
Yick Wo v. Hopkins84 to furnish the appropriate remedy. Given
changing attitudes about the death penalty, such an effort might
offer some hope for. eventual wholesale invalidation of the current
capital punishment regime.
Professor David Rudovsky argues for a litigation strategy to
attack racial profiling at the "point of entry" into the criminal justice
system, which is the period where selective enforcement perhaps is
most transparent. Rudovsky cites the success of using statistical
findings to eliminate racial profiling in several states and in customs
enforcement, 6 despite the cumulative disadvantages of Terry, Whren,
and other cases that have eviscerated Fourth Amendment

77.

Id. at 49.

78.
Id. at 50-51.
79.
Id. at 52.
80.
Id. at 53.
81.
Id. at 54.
82.
Id. at 55-56.
83.
Id. at 56-57.
84.
Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding unconstitutional, on
Equal Protection grounds, the discriminatory administration of an otherwise
facially-neutral law).
85.
Rudovsky, supra note 52, at 100-01.

86.

Id. at 102-06.
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protections against racially-discriminatory police practices.8 7 He
argues that the Equal Protection Clause offers some remedies; and
although changing political opinions since 9/11, combined with cases
such as Armstrong and McCleskey, make such challenges difficult,
statistical evidence has been particularly useful in challenging police
officers' (as opposed to prosecutors') conduct.88 Civil litigation is more
likely to provide systemic relief here, given the lack of an
exclusionary rule for Fourteenth Amendment violations.89 Moreover,
the success of the "innocence movement" in changing police
procedures during investigation and interrogation offers new
avenues to promote fairness for all defendants. 90
Miriam Gohara's commentary elaborates on Rudovsky's
approach for successful challenges to racial discrimination in
criminal justice enforcement. Despite both the procedural obstacles
created by a line of Supreme Court decisions that narrow the
grounds upon which race-based claims can be brought, and
restrictive legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act 9' and the Prison Litigation Reform Act 92, Rudovsky
highlights the success of some cases, like those attacking racial
profiling, in focusing on ameliorating racial discrimination at the
"point of entry" into the criminal justice system.93 Gohara argues that
"point of entry" challenges have succeeded not only because of
legislative action or consent decrees, but also due to the focus on
state action which makes for more persuasive evidence of
discrimination than the independent action of prosecutors and juries,
which can cloud evidence of state Fourteenth Amendment
violations .

87.
88.
89.

Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 113.

90.
Id. at 119-20.
91.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,

28 & 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
92.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 & 42
U.S.C. (2006)).

93.
94.

Rudovsky, supra note 52, at 97.
Miriam S. Gohara, Commentary, Sounding the Echoes of Racial
Injustice Beyond the Death Chamber: Proposed Strategies for Moving Past
McCleskey, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 124, 135-36 (2007).
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She notes the example of a NAACP Legal Defense Fund
challenge to the practice of arresting individuals who owed old fines
to the City of Gulfport. 95 Having appealing, sympathetic plaintiffs
(which is more likely in a point-of-entry as opposed to a capital case)
can better highlight the injustice of policies that discriminate on the
basis of race and social class. 96 Data produced by racial-profiling
statutes and consent decrees have made the evidence of
discrimination much more prominent. Gohara notes that empirical
data can bolster anecdotal evidence of racial and socioeconomic
discrimination, arguing that such evidence must be well-publicized to
erode the "'post-racial' illusion" courts have adopted since
McCleskey.97 For Gohara, litigation strategies at all levels of
government, complemented by education and public outreach
programs, can help bolster an understanding of the discrimination
that permeates the criminal justice system. 98 She notes how the
fiction of a post-racial world provides a space in which the legacies of
racial discrimination continue unchallenged, as McCleskey and
decisions such as Whren, 99 Armstrong,'00 and Wardlow'°'
demonstrate. McCleskey has virtually eliminated incentives to
address racial discrimination in the death penalty since the
challenge of the need for "smoking gun" evidence far outweighs any
procedural gains from the grant of standing to defendants to bring
race-of-victim claims.' °2 Despite Justice Powell's suggestion that such
concerns be directed to legislative bodies, McCleskey bolstered antireform arguments.0 3 Gohara's article provides a litigation roadmap
to reverse these trends.

95.
Id. at 136-37.
96.
Id. at 137.
97.
Id. at 141. In this illusion, whites as individuals and Americans
collectively are morally obligated to ignore the distinctions of racial minorities
from the whole, and race consciousness in law is a form of bias that leads to the
perpetuation of disadvantage. See Taslitz, supra note 2.
98.
Gohara, supra note 94, at 141-42.
99.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (holding that a police officer's subjective
reasons for stopping a car are not relevant when determining the reasonableness
of that stop under the Fourth Amendment).
100.
Armstrong, supra note 73.
101.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (holding that police
can consider characteristics of a high crime location in determining whether
behavior rises to the level of suspicion that warrants further investigation).
102.
Baldus, supra note 27, at 144. See also Pa. Supreme Court Comm. on
Racial & Gender Bias in the Justice System, supra note 55.
103.
Baldus, supra note 27, at 145.
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Proportionality remains a concern of legislative bodies,
despite the evisceration of proportionality as a basis for a
constitutional claim. Professors David C. Baldus, George Woodworth,
and Catherine M. Grosso examine proportionality evidence from
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey. Thanks to a recent set of
studies, Pennsylvania has McCleskey-like evidence of racial
disparities (with regard to the race of defendants rather than
victims), although its Supreme Court has not decided any cases on
the merits by relying on this evidence. 10 4 Maryland's governor
commissioned a study of the death penalty that revealed evidence of
systemic disparities in black-defendant/white-victim cases.'0 5 Despite
such evidence, and over a dissent arguing that the disparity was
enough to trigger Armstrong discovery rights, the Maryland Court of
Appeals ultimately adopted a McCleskey-like approach because of the
absence of convincing evidence
of discrimination by a prosecutor or
10 6
jury in any individual case.
The New Jersey Supreme Court developed an empirical
database that includes all cases, and has rejected McCleskey's
onerous burden of proof.' 7 While it has not ruled in favor of any
plaintiffs' claims of systemic discrimination, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has taken a much more proactive stance to ensure
the proportionate and consistent application of the death penalty."'
A decision in 1987 prompted county prosecutors to adopt capital
charging guidelines, a decision in 1989 established a rigorous
framework of monitoring, and a decision in 1992 rejected McCleskey's
"direct evidence of purposeful discrimination" requirement.'0 9 While
the New Jersey court has actively monitored race-based claims andprior to its 2007 abolition-reserved the death penalty for the most
aggravated cases, the fact that it has denied all claims of systemic
discrimination does not mean that the system is cured of race-based
effects. " 0° Rather, other more troubling factors may weigh into this

104.
Id. at 152-54.
105.
Id. at 159. See also Paternoster et al., supra note 26.
106.
Id. at 163-64. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 66-67 (Md. 2006)
(holding that general statewide statistics cannot establish a violation of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights; the defendant must establish specific
discriminatory intent in his case).
107.
Id. at 166-67.
108.
Id. at 164-65. See N.J. Const. art. 1, § 12.
109.
Baldus, supra note 27, at 166-67.
110.
Id. at 169-70.
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result, such as the fact that the Court has limited indirect evidence of
discrimination and has adopted a high burden of proof-on the order
of that required in McCleskey."' Nevertheless, the Court's attention
encouraged prosecutorial vigilance to avoid the taint of racism on
capital sentences.
Race-of-victim effects persisted despite such efforts in New
Jersey, raising questions about the ability of any system with broad
statutory aggravating factors to purge the system of race effects.
Moreover, given the unusual independence granted to Supreme
Court justices in New Jersey, this model might not be replicable in
states with elected justices. Therefore, Baldus argues, either total
abolition or a drastic narrowing of death-eligible crimes is essential
to reduce systemic racial discrimination in capital punishment." 2
Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson proposes that new social
science research on subconscious racial bias can be put to work to3
redesign the process of fact-finding and trial strategies."
Unconscious biases may animate racial associations and emotions
that then become engines of cognitive bias," 4 which in turn may
create perceptions and emotions that cast African-American
defendants as more culpable and therefore "deathworthy"." 5 Using
these dynamics in jury selection and trial strategy can reveal and
redirect the underlying racial frames of jurors and judges. She shows
the need for greater diversity among fact-finders and a focus on
individualized relief. 16 Johnson cautions that although only one
McCleskey claim has succeeded in the last twenty years,' 7 and that
case involved a black-on-black murder, in other cases racial disparity
evidence may have led courts to be more receptive to other unfairness
claims. 1 8 She uses Batson v.Kentucky" 9 to imagine how more diverse

Id. at 169.
111.
Id. at 177.
112.
Johnson, supra note 45, at 190. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R.
113.
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 969, 982-86 (2006)
(discussing the possibility that workplaces that promote positive depictions of
minorities and that are diverse may decrease implicit bias and therefore lessen
workplace discrimination).
Johnson, supra note 45, at 189.
114.
115.
Id. at 198; Eberhardt et al., supra note 15.
Johnson, supra note 45, at 178.
116.
Id. at 179-80.
117.
Id. at 184-85.
118.
119.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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juries can mitigate the effects of implicit and unconscious racial
bias. 2 °
Professor Angela Davis presents a framework for
understanding and addressing race and class disparities arising from
prosecutorial discretion. Such discretion is the root of many of the
unwarranted racial disparities in the American criminal justice
system.12 ' Even though most individual prosecutors are not
deliberately racist, race and class influence every stage of the
criminal justice system, contributing to disparate outcomes. 22 For
example, because "[riace often plays a role in the decision to detain
and/or arrest a suspect", a black defendant may be labeled a
recidivist when a "more criminal" white defendant will be treated as
a first-time offender deserving of leniency. 123 Davis argues that,
although the Supreme Court has ensured that no legal remedies are
available, prosecutors
must take responsibility for the racial impact
24
of their decisions. 1
Synthesizing Oyler v.Boles, Washington v. Davis, and Wayte
v. United States, Davis concludes that both discriminatory effect and
purpose must be shown to prove selective prosecution. 25 Moreover,
the United States v. Armstrong126 ruling sets an onerous threshold for
discovery in a selective prosecution case-a burden that most27
resource-constrained defendants will likely be unable to meet.
Similarly, the McCleskey decision is a symptom of the Court's
"aversion to challenging the exercise of prosecutorial discretion." 28
Given this aversion even in the face of pervasive evidence, reform
must be pursued outside of litigation. In particular, Davis argues
that racial impact studies should be conducted in prosecutors' offices.
These studies should track the race of the defendant and victim at
each step of the process. 129 The public dissemination of the results of
such studies would help motivate prosecutors to correct inequities

120.
Johnson, supra note 45, at 185-86.
121.
Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the CriminalJustice System: The
Role of the Prosecutor,39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 202, 202-03 (2007).
122.
Id. at 203.
123.
Id. at 209-10.
124.
Id. at 210.
125.
Id. at 211.
126.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
127.
Davis, supra note 121, at 214.
128.
Id. at 217.
129.
Id. at 219-20.
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and enable voters to elect prosecutors who care about eliminating
racial bias.'3 0 Davis also endorses an ABA Commission
recommendation to form Criminal Justice Racial and Ethnic Task
Forces to gather and disseminate social science and public policy
evidence on racial fairness in the administration of criminal
justice. 3 ' Acknowledging that there will be prosecutorial resistance,
Davis suggests ways to make the data collection requirements less
onerous. She also offers the Vera Institute of Justice's Prosecution
and Racial Justice Project as a model approach to reducing racial
bias at every stage of the prosecutorial process. 32 Above all, Davis
emphasizes that prosecutorial cooperation will be crucial in
eliminating
unwarranted racial disparities in the criminal justice
33
system.1
Legislation is the focus of two articles in this Symposium.
Professor Olatunde Johnson's contribution cites statements by the
U.S. Supreme Court as to its institutional incompetence to effectively
address disparate impact claims. 134 While noting the fundamental
dilemma-that legislatures' apathy towards these issues explains
why advocates have tried the courts-she recognizes that the Court's
decisions have left few options.
Johnson first recounts the failure of a federal Racial Justice
Act (RJA) to effectively overturn the McCleskey ruling. The RJA, first
proposed in 1988, sought to allow the use of statistics to shift the
burden of proof to demonstrate that racial disparities were "'clearly
and convincingly' explained by nondiscriminatory factors." 135 Later
versions, including the RJA that was added to the 1994 crime bill
that passed the House, imposed a reduced burden of proof and
eliminated state data collection requirements. Nonetheless, even
these concessions failed to convince those who felt the RJA would

130.
Id. at 221-22.
131.
Id. at 222-23.
132.
Id. at 228-29.
133.
Id. at 232.
134.
Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal
Justice, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 233, 233 (2007) (pointing out that the Court
states that "McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies"
and that "it is not the responsibility-or indeed even the right-of this Court to
determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes") (citing McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987)); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976);
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
135.
Johnson, 0., supra note 134, at 238-39 (citing H.R. 4442 § 3(c)).

20071

INTRODUCTION

impede the execution of capital punishment.'3 6 She then turns to the
Kentucky Racial Justice Act (KRJA),' 37 which has been the only state
law to explicitly address the reality of racial disparity in criminal
justice. But this weak law had a low standard of proof for the state
and only concerned discrimination by prosecutors in choosing to seek
the death penalty.' 38 The KRJA's success seems limited at best, and
some anecdotes suggest that the law has had the perverse
consequence of encouraging prosecutors to seek a death sentence in
even more cases. Johnson then discusses some other forms of review,
like state commissions and the (now defunct) New York death
penalty law, which explicitly
included evidence of racial bias in its
39
proportionality review.'
Johnson discusses the recent legislative reform movement to
impose moratoriums or to abolish outright the death penalty in
certain states (even as efforts to expand it continue in other states).
While racial inequalities have played a role in some states, such as in
Maryland's moratorium, concerns about the potential innocence of
some death row inmates have also featured prominently in reform
efforts and the overall decline in support for capital punishment.
Johnson then extends her discussion to racial fairness and
sentencing reform beyond the death penalty context, focusing
particularly on drug offenses. The concentration of resources on
particular types of policing activity may largely be responsible for
high minority incarceration rates. Highlighting a recurring theme of
unresponsiveness to progressive calls for reform-as demonstrated
by congressional inaction in reducing the sentencing disparity
between crack and powder cocaine-she notes the promise of state
drug law reform. Yet despite many states' drug law reforms, these
efforts often arise over concerns about the efficacy of punitive drug
laws rather than the racially disparate impact of harsh sentences.
While she appreciates an effort in Oregon to consider "racial impact
statements" in criminal justice sentencing, assumptions about high
minority criminality may likely make such explicitly race-based
reform efforts less successful.
There are further limitations to using racial disparity as a
focus for criminal justice reform. Race-based reform efforts may help
136.
137.
138.
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spur change, but the changes may ultimately be deracialized by
ignoring the racial imbalances that were the target of the corrective
amendments. For example, in Kimbrough, the Supreme Court upheld
sentencing departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
crack cocaine offenses, but only twice in the decision mentioned the
racial dimensions of the infamous 100-to-1 crack-powder cocaine
disparity, and then only in passing via a secondary citation to a five
year old report from the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 140 And, in
Connecticut, the state legislature eliminated the crack-powder
cocaine disparity without mentioning the racial impacts of the state's
repealed law. Like the Federal Sentencing Commission and the
Kimbrough court, the Connecticut legislature cited new social facts
disputing the allegedly greater harms of crack cocaine, barely
recognizing the racial imbalances in the administration of these

140.
See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007) (upholding a
trial judge's downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for a
defendant who pled guilty in 2005 to possession of 56 grams of crack cocaine,
stating that crack and powder cocaine merit equal treatment and rejecting the.
higher federal sentences for trafficking crack cocaine). See also Linda

Greenhouse, Justices Restore Judges' Control Over Sentencing, N.Y. Times, Dec.
11, 2007, at Al. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Kimbrough majority, noted that
the U.S. Sentencing Commission's action to reduce the crack-cocaine sentencing
disparity was based on its finding that the "problems associated with the 100-to-1
drug quantity ratio [are] urgent and compelling, and that the higher penalties for
crack cocaine far "overstate" both "the relative harmfulness" of crack cocaine and
the "seriousness of most crack cocaine offenses." Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 9. See
also United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and
Federal Sentencing Policy 8 (May 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf. The Commission promulgated the guideline
amendment as a measure to alleviate some of the problems noted by Justice
Ginsburg. The Commission also recommended that Congress take further steps
to reduce the sentencing disparity in federal law. The lengthy Kimbrough opinion
mentioned race only twice. First, the majority cited the Commission's 2002 report
that recognized and criticized the crack/powder sentencing differential as
"foster[ing] disrespect for and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system"
because of a "widely-held perception" that it "promotes unwarranted disparity
based on race." United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress:
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 103 (May 2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf. Second, the majority
cited the statements in the 2002 Report that approximately 85% of defendants
convicted of crack offenses in federal court are black; thus the severe sentences
required by the 100-to-1 ratio are imposed "primarily upon black offenders."
Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 9, 15.
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laws.' 4 ' More generally, a focus on racial politics detracts from the
larger issue of America's "over-reliance on incarceration" as well as
the need to forge coalitions to address criminal justice reform-even
though racial subjugation is an implicit aspect of harsh sentencing

policies. 142
Professor Dorothy Roberts emphasizes the need for a full
understanding of the extent of racial oppression before seeking to
rectify the problem through a concerted campaign toward abolition of
a broad set of racially destructive laws and policies. McCleskey and
cases requiring individualized proof of racial discrimination "treat[]
racial bias as a system malfunction" when the criminal justice
system is designed to subjugate African Americans. 43 She notes that
the McCleskey decision recognized that a different decision would
threaten the entire criminal justice system, given how pervasive
racial bias is in the system)4
capital
Roberts
contends that mass incarceration,
punishment, and police terror are the direct progeny of slavery and
Jim Crow.' 41 "[M]ass imprisonment of African Americans should be
viewed as a state measure to supervise citizens en masse on the basis
of race rather than a race-neutral effort to control crime or mete out
offenders' just deserts," especially in light of the fact that "stable
incarceration rates appear in a period of white hegemony and a
stable racial order" and spikes in minority incarceration rates occur
during times of upheaval in the racial hierarchy. 46 Capital
punishment and police terror more generally have their origins in the
lynchings of previous epochs, designed to reassert white
dominance.' 47 Roberts concludes the entire criminal justice system is
a vehicle for the reinforcement of racial hierarchy and control.

141.
13 states had similar disparities as of 2005, but only Connecticut has
acted legislatively to eliminate the disparity. See HB 6975, available at

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ACT/Pa/pdf/2005PA-00248-RO0HB-06975-PA.pdf,
enacting Public Act No. 05-248, ended the sentencing disparity between crack

and powder cocaine effective July 1, 2005.
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Abolition of all these forms of racist control is necessary for any
lasting change to occur.
Theodore Shaw, whose vision inspired and animated the
Symposium, also paints a rich and detailed picture of the dynamics of
racial inequality. He begins by arguing that the Supreme Court has
applied a "gratuitously cramped constitutional jurisprudence" to
racial discrimination claims by minorities. Shaw notes that
desegregation jurisprudence adopted a de facto/de jure distinction not
found anywhere in the Constitution. He cites the intentionality
requirement of Washington v. Davis 48 as an example of how courts
have washed their hands of "societal discrimination".'4 9 Courts have
been much more receptive, however, to equal protection arguments
brought by whites in "reverse discrimination" affirmative action and
gerrymandering cases.
In particular, "McCleskey v. Kemp stands out as a decision
[that] has erected a barrier to challenging" discriminatory policies.15 °
Subsequent studies have shown that the Baldus Study'5 ' was not an
anomalous result. Continued disparities in capital punishment,
particularly in "lynching states," are the result of the willful
ignorance of McCleskey.5 2 The impact of the War on Drugs on
minority communities offers further evidence of the racial bias that
permeates the criminal justice system, and of the willingness of
judges to tolerate disparities.' 53 Even in the face of this discouraging
situation, however, Shaw implores his listeners to maintain hope and
54
to act to create a more just reality.1
The historical trajectory leading to McCleskey shows the
inevitability of a constitutional conflict from two strains in American
law and society that had been building for decades. Robert Stroup
148.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a law in spite of
its racially disproportionate impact because it lacked a racially discriminatory
purpose).
149.
Theodore M. Shaw, Director-Counsel and President of the NAACP

Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Keynote Address at the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and Columbia Law School Symposium: Pursuing
Racial Fairness in the Administration of Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey
v. Kemp (Mar. 3, 2007), in 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 59, 61 (2007).
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begins this history with a detailed recounting of the trial that led to
the Supreme Court case. The McCleskeys hired a private lawyer to
defend their son Warren, but had no money to provide a thorough
defense. 55 McCleskey's childhood, the murder, and the trial all
occurred in a context of rampant segregation, discrimination, and
economic disparities in the American South of the 1960s and 1970s.
As a result of residential segregation, the McCleskey jury included
eleven Whites and one Black, most of whom presumably lived in
areas with limited racial intermixing. 156 After McCleskey's
conviction, the appeals process took place during the Reagan era.
During this time of growing income inequality, social welfare support
and legal services for indigent criminal defendants weakened,
further hurting poor Americans, with a disproportionate impact on
African Americans.' 57 During the early 1980s when McCleskey's
appeals proceeded, President Reagan wanted judges to be more
concerned about society than criminal rights, and sought more
punitive 8 punishments while simultaneously escalating the War on
15
Drugs.
Stroup also provides a legal context for the decision. He
explains that advocates had hope of success when the Court granted
certiorari, given the several "liberal" victories in the October 1985
Term, which upheld affirmative action and voting rights while
permitting the use of statistical evidence to prove racial
discrimination. 5 9 Given these decisions, a McCleskey victory seemed
possible. 60 However, the Court "lacked the will" to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment because of the upheaval that a ruling for
McCleskey might cause, and not just in criminal law and
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procedure. 16' Stroup's detailed recounting of the social and historical
context of the era calls attention to the present. The same forces
which existed at the time of McCleskey exist today. These forces are
related to race and criminal law, along with pervasive racial
disparities in housing, education, health care, and other domains of
law and social policy. Stroup's history of the McCleskey era
illuminates the present as the staging ground for the next era of
litigation and political struggle.
IV. CONCLUSION
The articles in this Symposium offer a set of connected
frameworks for a renewal of legal advocacy and scholarship to
address the principles of racial justice. The product of interactions
between legal scholars, civil rights advocates, litigation experts, and
empirical researchers, the richly nuanced articles that follow present
a wide range of thoughtful and passionate approaches to the
challenge of McCleskey. The authors offer innovative ways to address
the problem of racial bias in criminal justice. Some cite the need for
continued rigorous studies to offer clear evidence of disparate racial
impact that might create sufficient media outrage to warrant
legislative or judicial changes. Others cite the Kentucky Racial
Justice Act' 62 or the New Jersey Supreme Court's efforts to reduce
racial impact16 as models, although the results of those efforts have
been mixed at best, and political conditions preclude those models
from being adopted more widely. Although the authors' positions
range from cautious hope to pessimism, they share a desire to force
this country to consider the implications of racial disparities that
derive from a long history of racial subjugation, if not from racial
animus in some individual cases. With the implicit toleration of
racial discrimination by the Supreme Court, however, the McCleskey
decision impedes the ability of advocates to convince other
stakeholders to use their efforts to ensure a more race-neutral
161.
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criminal justice system. The Symposium begins the process of
building an architecture of law, policy, social science, and legal and
civil rights advocacy to reverse the legacy and burden of McCleskey,
which will, with hope, spark new analyses, strategic debate, and
action on a variety of fronts.

